BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 1

Article 3

3-1-1994

Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial
Review
Shawn Gunnarson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Shawn Gunnarson, Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial Review, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 151 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Using History to Reshape the Discussion of
Judicial Review
On September 26,1957, a memorable image dominated the
front page of The New York Times: nine African-American
children mounted the front steps of Little Rock Central High
School, guarded by U.S. soldiers bearing rifles with fixed bayonets.' Behind this image lay a century-long struggle of AfricanAmericans to wrest from their neighbors the political and legal
equality guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Arnendment~.~
In many respects, the struggle to desegregate Central High was political, as well as moral and constitutional. It pitted blacks against whites, the North against the
South, and the government of the United States against the
government of Arkansas. Despite its deeply political character,
however, the dispute was submitted for resolution to the United States Supreme C0u1-t.~
Alexis de Tocqueville observed the American transformation of political conflicts into legal cases more than a century
ago: "There is hardly a political question in the United States
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."4 This
transformation gives American judges "immense political powerY5 which they exercise perhaps most significantly in the
form of judicial review? An American judge wields tremendous

1. N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 26, 1957, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), supplemented by Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown In; Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879);
In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); ERIC FONER,RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,1863-1877 (1988); RICHARD
THE HISTORYOF BROWNV. BOARDOF EDUCATION AND
KLUGE&SIMPLEJUSTICE:
BLACK AMERICA'SSTRUGGLEFOR EQUALP~Y
(1976); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
AGAINSTSEGREGATED
EDUCATION,
1925-1950 (1987);
NAACP's LEGALSTRATEGY
J. HARVIE W I ~ N S O N
111, FROMBROWNTO BAKISE: THE SUPREMECOURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION:1954-1978 (1979).
3. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358, U.S. 1 (1958).
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
4. AL,EXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1966).
5. Id. at 100.
6. See id. at 100-01. Judicial review has been called "the most distinctive
American contribution to the entire history of Western constitutionalism," although
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political power when he reviews a statute and finds it unconstitutional. The controversies sparked by the exercise of that
power have generated a large and lively body of scholarship.'
Much of the scholarship on judicial review focuses on a
single question: 'Was the judicial review authority asserted in
Marbury v. Madison a usurpation [of legislative or executive
authority]?"' That question has several facets, including closely related inquiries into the historic& and democraticlo legitimacy of judicial review. An inquiry into the historical legitimacy of judicial review focuses on Marbury v. Madison" because
in that case the Supreme Court first announced its authority t o
review congressional statutes on the basis of their constitutionality.12 A conventional interpretation of Marbury is that the
Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall,
invented judicial review without supporting precedent or signif-

at least one author traces its theoretical roots to eighteenth-century French
AND LIBERTY103 (1988); J.M. KEUY,
physiocrats. MICHAELKAMMEN,SOVEREIGNTY
A SHORTHISTORYOF WESTERNLEGALTHEORY279-80 (1992). Leaving aside the
question of its origins, the American variety of judicial review has wielded remarkable international influence, especially on the postwar development of strong supreme courts in India and Japan and, to a lesser extent, on the establishment of
constitutional courts in Western Europe. See Donald P. Kommers, Judicial Review:
Its Influence A b d , 428 ANNALSAM. ACAD.POL. & SOC. &I. 52, 59 (1976).
(1991);
7. See, e.g., 1 BRUCEACKERMAN,WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT(1977); ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH:THE SUPREMECOURTAT THE BAR OF POLITICS(1962); ROBERTH. BORK,
THE TEMPTINGOF AMERICA(1990); LOUISB. BOUDIN,GOVERNMENTBY JUDICIARY
(1932); WILLIAMW. CROSSKEY,
POLPTICSAND THE CONSTITUTION
W THE HIS~ORY
OF
THE UNITEDSTATES(1953); JOHN
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST:
A THEORYOF
JUDICIAL
REVIEW(1980); LEARNEDHAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); SANFORD
THE CONSTITUTION
IN
LEVINSON,CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH (1988); MICHAELJ. PERRY,
THE COURTS:LAW OR POLITICS?(1994) [hereinaRer PERRY,THE C O N ~ I OINN
THE COURTS];MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COUWTS,AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRYINTO THE LEGITIMACY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICYMAKING BY
THE JUDICIARY
(1982); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Paul Brest, The Misconceived @est for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Edward S. Corwin,
Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MIcH. L. REV. 538
(1914); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have a n Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.L. REV.
703 (1975); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARv. L. REV.885 (1985); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HAW. L. REV. 129 (1893); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutml Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1959).
LAW13 (12th ed. 1991) (italics added).
8. GERALDGUNTHE& CONSTITUTIONAL
9. See id.
10. See id. at 19.
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Id. at 177-78.

JUDICIAL REWIEW
icant historical antecedent.13 A statement by Professor William Crosskey epitomizes this interpretation: "[Jludicial review
of Congressional acts was not intended, or provided, in the
Constitution."" If true, this conventional interpretation of
Marbury makes judicial review the most significant ipse dizit
in American law.
This Comment, which questions that conventional interpretation of Marbury, focuses on three questions. First, what
did the men who wrote, debated, and ratified the Constitution
say about judicial review?'' Second, what do those statements
reveal about the role they thought judicial review would play in
the American constitutional system? Third, what conclusions
can be drawn from this historical inquiry for today's discussion
of judicial review?
This Comment demonstrates that many of those who wrote
and ratified the Constitution made trenchant and suggestive
remarks about judicial review and the role that they anticipated it would play in the new constitutional order. Despite other
disagreements, even over the wisdom of ratifying the Constitution, the overwhelming majority of the Founders who said anything about judicial review agreed on a particular theory of it.
Based on such historical evidence, this Comment offers two
modest proposals intended to reshape the contemporary discussion of judicial review. First, it proposes to use the theory of

13. See, e.g., 1 BOUDIN,supra note 7, at 223-24; ROBERTL. CLINTON,
&~LIISON AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW5-6 (1989); 2 CROSSKEY,
supra note 7,
at 1000; HAND, supra note 7, at 6-11.
supra note 7, at 1000.
14. 2 CROSSKEY,
15. James Hutson, the editor of the most recent supplement to THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERALCONVENTION
OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS],has cast some doubt on the integrity of the most important records
of the Founding, including James Madison's NOTES OF DEBATESIN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION
OF 1787 (James Madison rep., W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966), and
ON THE ADJonathan Elliot's THE DEBATESIN THE SEVERALSTATE CONVENTIONS,
OPTION OF THE FEDERALCONSTITUTION,
AS RECOMMENDED
BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot coll. & rev., reprint ed., Ayer
Co. 1987) (2d ed. 1888). ."[I]n all cases the resulting documents are not full, reliable records of the debates at the Constitutional and ratifying conventions." James
H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986). Hutson's basic point is that "the mere fact that
a record is-in print does not make it reliable." Id. at 39. As Hutson reminds us,
human record keeping is imperfect. But learning all we can from the records of
the Founders remains nonetheless indispensable if we are to understand the Constitution they wrote. Imperfect as the records may be, we have no other guide to
the thinking of those constitutional architects whose framework of national political
life has sheltered our nation for more than two centuries.

MARBURYV.
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judicial review shared by many Founders as the appropriate
reference point for a well-formed discussion of judicial review.
Second, it proposes to truncate the current form of the discussion of judicial review by lopping off two extreme positions:
legislative deference and policymaking discretion. To explain
and defend these proposals, this Comment will first revisit the
Hand-Wechsler debate, one of the landmark episodes in the
development of constitutional theory since 1945. As part of
taking up that debate, it will describe how two extreme positions in today's discussion of judicial review depend on the
same interpretation of Marbury. Next, it will undermine that
interpretation by presenting and discussing several remarks
made in the Constitutional Convention, in the popular press
during the ratification process, and in some of the state ratifying conventions. Finally, after articulating the theory of judicial
review that these statements reveal, this Comment will argue
that this early theory should be treated as the appropriate
reference point for any serious contemporary discussion of judicial review. It will suggest further that today's discussion of
judicial review should be reshaped by abandoning the extreme
positions of legislative deference and policymaking discretion,
given their common foundation on false history.
Judicial review is so often discussed that a brief explanation of some preliminary matters may forestall potential misunderstandings.
First, judicial review is customarily associated with history
under the heading of "Originali~m."'~This Comment makes
no attempt to describe "the original theory of judicial review,"
whatever that might be. Nor does it pass judgment on
Originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. The
difference between my use of history in this Comment and the
use to which history is generally put in the service of
Originalism turns on the distinction between making use of
history to enlighten the discussion of judicial review and conceiving of judicial review in terms of history." Nor, finally,
does this Comment address in more general terms the proper

16. See generally INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE DEBATEOVER ORIGINAL INTENT(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (collecting several well-known essays on
Originalism).
17. Cf. Michael Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 3
203, 208 (1938) (distinguishing between a jurisprudence that makes use of
POLITICA
history and one that conceives of jurisprudence in terms of history).

JUDICIAL WVIEW
use of history by the Supreme Court when it adjudicates cases
under the Constitution.18 Instead this Comment proposes to
use history to reshape the scholarly discussion of judicial review as it is mainly, although not exclusively, carried on among
constitutional theorists.
Second, this Comment proceeds with two assumptions
about history: historical evidence can prove or disprove historical opinions, and history is relevant to a serious discussion of
judicial review. Some commentators, such as Michael Perry,
have cast doubt on the relevance of history to the discussion of
judicial review.
The debate about whether the Constitution establishes
judicial review has limited relevance today. The practice of
judicial review, including the modern practice of judicial review of federal acts, has indisputably become a definite feature of American governmentiindeed, a feature we unreservedly hold out as a model to the world. Any argument that
judicial review was not established by the Constitution and is,
in that sense, "unconstitutional," however plausible the argument may be a s an historical matter, is, a t this point in the
development of American political institutions and practices,
antiquarian. In the sense that judicial review is now a definiconstitutive feative feature of American government-a
ture-judicial review is ~onstitutional.'~

To some extent Perry is right, but he misses an important
point. Significant positions in the discussion of the proper scope
and exercise of judicial review rely on historical interpretations
that can be supported or undermined through historical inquiry. Unlike Perry's straw man, this Comment will not make a
two-step move from "Judicial review has (or lacks) historical
support" to the conclusion "Judicial review should be exercised
(or abandoned)." Instead it will make three moves: from "the
Supreme Court's articulation of judicial review in Marbury u.
Madison has strong historical support" to "rhetorical positions
inconsistent with the previous claim must be rejected" t o the
conclusion, "the discussion of judicial review should be reshaped t o reflect the rejection of such positions." In short, an
inquiry into the historical antecedents of Marbury is no mere
18. See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Mair,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (criticizing the Court's use of history in constitutional
adjudication).
19. PERRY,
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 7, at 26.
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academic exercise. Once the practice of judicial review is taken
for granted, the proper scope of the exercise of judicial review
remains debatable. And it is that debate that the historical
inquiry contained in this Comment is intended to reshape.
Third, this Comment travels over historical ground that
other writers have also surveyed a t length?' But repeated
presentation of historical evidence showing that the Founders
anticipated the Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review in
Marbury has been so far unable to stifle what Hart and Wechsler called "the curiously persisting myth of us~rpation."~'
Another presentation of similar historical evidence may not persuade every reader that the Supreme Court did not usurp the
power of judicial review, but it may persuade some readers to
reconsider how they discuss judicial review. If so, it will have
served a worthwhile purpose. Besides, a summary of the historical evidence would provide an insufficient foundation for the
theoretical proposals a t the heart of this Comment.
Finally, while other writers have moved from history to
the^$^ in a manner resembling the move made in this Com-

20. See, e.g., CHARLES
A. BEARD,THE SUPREME
COURTAND THE CONSTITUTION
15-72 (1938); RAOULBERGER,CONGRESS
V. THE SUPREME
COURT(1969); CLINTON,
supm note 13, at 56-71; SYLVIA
SNOWISS,JUDICIAL
REVIEWAND THE LAW OF THE
CONSMTUTION
38-44, 78-83 (1990); CHARLESWARREN,CONGRESS,
THE CONSJXTUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT49-70 (new rev. & enlarged ed. 1935). 1 began
researching this Comment by delving into the primary sources to learn what the
Founders said and wrote about judicial review. My study of secondary materials
deliberately came later. Only when my research and writing based on primary
sources was all but completed did I discover, not surprisingly, that other scholars
have addressed similar historical questions. However, the historical conclusions of
this Comment were first feached independently. That I interpreted the historical
evidence like other scholars before knowing of their work tends to strengthen my
conclusions. As the Apostle Paul wrote, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses
shall every word be established." 2 Corinthians 13:l (King James).
21. PAULM. BATOREl' AL., HART & WECHSLER'STHE FEDERAL
COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM8 (3d ed. 1988).
22. When the historical research for this Comment was nearly f ~ s h e d ,I
happened to find two recently-published books whose arguments move from history
to theory, a move which generally resembles the one that I propose to make:
CLINTON,
supra note 13, and SNOWISS,supra note 20. Both authors review similar,
ofkn identical, historical evidence. Yet they reach opposite conclusions. Clinton argues that the modern interpretation of Marbury as the fountainhead of judicial
innovation is historically incorrect and that it has led to an unduly broad concepsupra note 13, at 223-33. Snowiss contends,
tion of judicial review. See CLINTON,
however, that Marbury represents a genuine innovation by the Marshall Court,
SNOWISS,supra note 20, at vii-viii, and that the most appropriate modern conception of judicial review combines "the judicial defense of fundamental values . . .
with some form of restraint." Id. at 216.

1511
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ment, no other writer has employed that move to reach the
same conclusions.
11.

DEBATE
OVER HISTORICAL
~ G I T I M A C YAND ITS
CONNECTION
WITH TWO EXTREME
CONCEPTIONS
OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW

The significance of the legitimacy debate was highlighted
during one of the most controversial moments in twentiethcentury constitutional history: the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of E d u ~ a t i o n Brown
.~~
generated extraordinary theoretical debate over the historical legitimacy of judicial
review.24
One of the best-known debates over the historical legitimacy of judicial review occurred a few years after Brown was
decided.25Judge Learned Hand delivered the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School in 1958;26Professor
Herbert Wechsler responded in the Holmes Lectures the following year2'
Hand's main historical claim was that the Constitutional
Convention probably would not have enacted an express grant
of judicial review "if the issue had been put to it that courts
Based on
should have power to invalidate acts of Congre~s."~~
this historical claim, as well as on textual arguments, Judge
Hand magisterially denied the legitimacy of judicial review.

This Comment does not try to settle the difference of opinion between Clinton
and Snowiss. Although it concludes that the historical evidence supports Clinton's
opinion, it addresses a slightly different question than the one Snowiss addresses:
Did Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury change the theory of judicial review
previously expressed by the Founders? This Comment focuses instead on whether
those who wrote and ratified the Constitution said enough about judicial review to
provide reasonably clear evidence of (1) their intention that federal courts should
exercise judicial review and (2) their theory of judicial review. Therefore, my research provides no basis to evaluate Snowiss's thesis.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), supplemented by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown IT).
24. For an interesting treatment of the relationship between Brown u. Buard
of Education and the debates over the legitimacy of judicial review, see MORTON
J.
Ho~wrrz,THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICANLAW 1870-1960, at 258-68 (1992).
25. Horwitz and Gunther both treat the Hand-Wechsler debate as a key episode in the history of questioning the legitimacy of judicial review. Id.; GUNTHER,
supm note 8, at 18-19.
supra note 7 .
26. The text of Judge Hand's lectures can be found at HAND,
27. The text of Professor Wechsler's lectures can be found at Wechsler, supra
note 7 .
28. HAND, supra note 7, at 7.
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There was nothing in the United States Constitution that
gave courts any authority to review the decisions of Congress;
and it was a plausible-indeed to my mind an unanswerable-argument that it invaded the "Separation of Powers"
which, as so many then believed, was the condition of all free
government."

Professor Wechsler responded a year later in his Holmes
Lectures by noting that the historical evidence he and Henry
Hart had gathered pointed towards the opposite c o n c l ~ s i o n . ~ ~
"The grant of judicial power was to include the power, where
necessary in the decision of cases, to disregard state or federal
statutes found to be unconstitutional. Despite the curiously
persisting myth of usurpation, the Convention's understanding
on this point emerges from its records with singular clarity."31
Wechsler also cited a book reviews2 by Hart in which Hart
wrote a devastating critique of Crosskey's argument that the
Founders had not intended to grant federal courts the power of
judicial review.33 From this historical evidence Wechsler concluded, "I have not the slightest doubt respecting the legitimacy
of judicial review, whether the action called in question in a
case which otherwise is proper for adjudication is legislative or
executive, federal or state."34
Despite appearances, the legitimacy debate carries more
than academic interest. As Gerald Gunther has observed, ''evaluations of the content as well as the timing of contemporary
court decisions may evolve from discussions beginning with
concern over legitimacy."35 A hotly contested aspect of the discussion of judicial review focuses on the scope of its exercise.

29. Id. at 10-11.
30. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 5 11.13.
31. HENRYHART & HERBERTWECHSLER,THE FEDERALCOURTS AND THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM14 (1st ed. 1953).
32. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 5 11.13 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor
Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954) (reviewing 2
supra note 7).
CROSSKEY,
33. See s u p m text accompanying note 14. Crosskey's arguments and Hart's
response may be taken as a less famous, though no less interesting, episode in the
history of the legitimacy debate. Both were published less than five years before
Judge Hand delivered his Holmes Lectures. They therefore form a useful and unduly neglected companion to the more famous Hand-Wechsler debate.
34. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 2.
35. GUNTHER,supra note 8, at 18.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
At one extreme stands the Supreme Court's statement of
its judicial supremacy in Cooper u. Aaron? There the Court
wrote, "This decision [Marbury] declared the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional ~ystern.''~'By labeling the Cooper Court's statement of judicial supremacy "extreme," I condone neither the unlawful actions of Governor
Faubus nor the racism that gave those actions their perverse
force. I merely use the label to indicate a common reading of
Cooper as an overly ambitious statement of the Court's place i n
the constitutional system.38
At the other extreme stands the Supreme Court's statement in Williamson u. Lee Optical:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought. . . . "For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts."3g

This passage denotes the Court's rejection of substantive due
process as applied to legislation regulating economic conduct.
But it also connotes a more general point: an approach to judicial review founded on legislative deference.
Both extremes4' depend on the premise that the Court
lacked an historical basis for its opinion in Marbury. The Williamson position--courts should defer to the legislature when
exercising judicial review-corresponds to Judge Hand's argu36. 358 US. 1 (1958).
37. Id. at 18.
38. See, e.g., Sanford Levins'on, Conversing About Justice, 100 YALEL.J. 1855,
B. WHITE, JUSTICE
AS TRANSLATION
(1990))
1872 n.110 (1991) (reviewing JAMES
(rejecting the Cooper Court's claim to interpretive supremacy as "papalist").
39. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1876)) (citations omitted).
40. Incidentally, it is probably no accident that Cooper, a civil rights case, is
the high-water mark of judicial supremacy and Williamson, a property rights case,
is the low-water mark. See id. at 485-90; Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16-17. The modern
Supreme Court has distinguished between personal and property rights, scrutinizing legislation in the former category and barely reviewing legislation in the latter.
See, e.g., Griswold v. C o ~ e d i c u t ,381 US. 479, 481-82 (1965); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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ment, which explicitly followed from the claim that Marbury
lacked historical legitimacy." And the Cooper Court relied on
an interpretation of Marbury that a t least one commentator
calls "ahistorical" in its over-expansive conception of judicial
authority.42 The same commentator associates the broad reading of Marbury expressed by Cooper with the claim that
Marbury lacked historical legitirna~y.~~
"According to this construction [of Marbury], since judicial review originated from a
coup d'etat, engineered for political purposes, Marbury is the
primary antecedent for judicial policymaking in the modern
era. . . . Marbury has become shorthand for judicial supremacy,
as
If historical inquiry demonstrated that the Founders anticipated that federal courts would exercise judicial review, these extreme conceptions of judicial review could be dismissed a s equally unsound. Contemporary discussion of the
proper scope and exercise of judicial review could then proceed
along less polemical, more useful paths.

A. Historical Origins
The convention that produced the Constitution originated
in 1785 when the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia tried to
regulate navigation on the Potomac and Pocomoke Rivers, as
well as on Chesapeake Bay.'5 Commissioners representing
Maryland and Virginia met and soon realized that they could
not intelligently regulate interstate navigation without the
authority to establish a navy or impose tariffs? On the advice
of its commissioners, the Virginia legislature passed a resolution in January 1786 that appointed representatives to meet
with representatives of the other states to devise "a uniform

41. See Williamson, 348 US. at 488; HAND, supra note 7, at 6-7, 10-11. However, Wechsler's conception of judicial review bears no resemblance to the Court's
statement of its power in Cooper. On the contrary, Wechsler saw judicial review in
very different terms indeed. T h e duty, to be sure, is not that of policing or advising legislatures or executives . . . . It is the duty to decide the litigated case and
to decide it in accordance with the law . . . ." Wechsler, supra note 7, at 6.
42. CLINTON,
supra note 13, at 15.
43. See id. at 192; id. at 14-15.
44. Id. at 219-20.
ON THE CONSITTUTION
OF THE UNITED
45. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
STATES105 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (abr. ed. 1833).
46. Id.
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system in their commercial relations.'"' Virginia's resolution
was sent to the other states, but only four states responded.
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and P e ~ s y l v a n i amet with
Virginia to discuss common trade problems.48
After meeting at Annapolis, Maryland, representatives of
these five states determined that they could not resolve their
trade problems by themselves because they lacked the necessary powers and because not every state was r e p r e ~ e n t e d . ~ ~
Therefore, they submitted a report to all the states and to Congress recommending the appointment of commissioners to consider the "state of the union" under the Articles of Confederation?'
Virginia immediately appointed delegates to meet accordingly." But the resolution was delivered to an inert Congress
and languished until New York presented a motion in Congress
requiring that all states meet to revise and propose amendments to the Articles of C~nfederation.~~
On February 21,
1787, Congress finally passed a resolution authorizing what
has come to be called the Constitutional or Philadelphia Convention.
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient
that on the second Monday in May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several States be
held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress
and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions
therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by
the States render the federal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union.53

The Convention first met at Philadelphia in the State
House on May 1 4 t h . ~But eleven days passed before the quorum of seven states55 had gathered so that the Convention
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
See d.
Id. at 106-07.
Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787, 32 J. CONTINENTAL
CONG.1774-1789, at 74
(Roscoe R. Hill ed., reprint ed. 1968) (footnotes omitted).
54. See 1 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 1.
55. See 1 id. at 3.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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could proceed with its business. Once it began in earnest, the
Convention regularly met between May 25th and September
17th, debating what form of government would best suit the
American states.56
On May 29, 1787, barely two weeks into the proceedings,
Virginia's Governor, Edmund Randolph, introduced fifteen
resolutions, known collectively as the Virginia Plan.57 A day
later the delegates confronted the scope of their own authority
in deciding whether the Articles of Confederation could be satisfactorily-amended. Congress had authorized the delegates to
meet "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
yet some doubted whether this authorizaof Confederati~n,"~~
tion could or should be adhered to. Charles Cotesworth Pinkney of South Carolina reminded the delegates that the Convention had not been authorized t o discuss the construction of a
government "founded on different principles from the federal
Constit~tion"~~
(by which he evidently meant the Articles of
Confederation). George Mason of Virginia disagreed. He argued
that the Confederation lacked the essential power to compel
"delinquent state^"^' t o obey the Articles and that it would
continue to lack that power until a national government could
"directly operate on individuals*' rather than on states, as
the Articles of Confederation then authorizedea2In the end,
the delegates decided t o exceed the express terms of their congressional mandate, resolving "that a national Governt. ought
t o be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive
& Judiciar~.'~~
B. Judicial Review and the Council of Revision
In the records of the Constitutional Convention, the concept of judicial review appears most often in debates about the
Council of Revision. The Council originated with the eighth
resolution of the Virginia Plan, which proposed the creation of

56. See 1 id. at 1; 2 id. at 649.
57. See 1 id. at 22-23.
58. Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787, supra note 53, at 74.
supra note 15, at 34.
59. 1 RECORDS,
60. 1 id.
61. 1 id.
62. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION
of 1781, arts. 11, 111, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
& LEGALHISTORY69, 70 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
1989).
63. 1 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 35.
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a "council of revision"64composed of "the Executive and a con~
be given
venient number of the National J u d i ~ i a r y . "It~would
the authority t o review every act of Congress, whether previously passed or vetoed? If an a d was previously passed, the
Council could veto it and Congress could then revive the act
only by passing it again." If previously vetoed, the Council
could reenact the legislation, unless it was vetoed again by a
certain percentage (presumably t o be worked out at the Convention) of each branch of Congress? This resolution soon
attracted heated debate.
On June 4th, while meeting as a Committee of the Whole,
the Convention considered the proposed Council of R e v i ~ i o n . ~ ~
According to Madison's record, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
spoke first." Gerry expressed doubt whether the Council
ought to include federal judges, reasoning that they would have
enough power to repel "encroachments" on their authority "by
their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding
on their Constit~tionalit~."~~
He further noted that some state
courts had already exercised similar power, a suggestion that
received "general approbation."" Rufus King, also of Massachusetts, agreed. He thought that judges should not have a
veto because they would be already empowered to "stop the
operation of such [laws] as shall appear repugnant to the constit~tion."~~
The next time the idea of judicial review arose in the context of the debates on the Council of Revision was on July
2 1 s t . ~James
~
Wilson of Pennsylvania again proposed that fed-

64. 1 id. at 21.
65. 1 d.When the Convention met, New York had a Council of Revision for
determining questions of constitutionality. It was composed of members of the Executive and Judiciary and may have been the model for the Virginia Plan's proposal. See FORREST
MCDONALD,
NOWS ORDOSECLORUM:
THE INTEUECTUALORIGINS
OF THE C O N S T ~ O
85N(1985).
supra note 15, at 21.
66. 1 RECORDS,
67. 1 id.
68. 1 id.
69. 1 id. at 97 (emphasis omitted).
70. 1 id.
71. 1 id.
72. 1 id. But see Thayer, supra note 7, at 132-34(discussing the surprise and
opposition that greeted the doctrine of judicial review during the late eighteenth
century in Rhode Island, New York, Vermont, and Co~edicut).
73. 1 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 109.
74. 2 id. at 73.
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era1 judges sit on the Co~ncil,'~despite the Convention's earlier rejection of the same proposal.76He returned to Mr. Gerry's
argument7' (without expressly citing it) that federal judges
would have enough power to protect their institutional integrity through their authority "as expositors of the law^.'"^ Wilson admitted that this argument had some weight.79However,
he contended that the power of judges t o declare a law unconstitutional "did not go far enough."80 He worried that laws
could be "unwise," "dangerous," or "destructive," without being
"so unconstitutional as t o justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect."81
Wilson did not disagree with Gerry about whether the
federal judiciary would exercise judicial review; the more pressing question for Wilson was whether judicial review provided a
sufficient check on legislative excesses. He concluded, contrary
to Gerry, that it did not.
In response to Wilson,. Luther Martin of Maryland "considered the association of the Judges with the Executive as a
Martin argued that federal judges
dangerous inn~vation."~~
would address "the Constitutionality of laws"83as part of their
ordinary judicial function and that they would exercise "a negative on the laws"* as a matter of course. Placing judges on
the Council of Revision would give them "a double negati~e":'~
federal judges would exercise the power of judicial review as
part of their ordinary jurisdiction and hold veto power by virtue
of their place on the Council of Revisiod6

75. 2 id.
76. 1 id. at 140 (recording the June 6th vote against the proposal that federal judges sit on the Council of Revision).
77. 1 id. at 97.
78. 2 id. at 73.
79. 2 id.
80. 2 id.
81. 2 id.; see also Thayer, supra note 7, at 155-56 (arguing that the Constitution does not effectively restrain Congress and state legislatures from doing
"harm and evil" and that the remedy lies with the people, not the courts.)
82. 2 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 76.
83. 2 id.
84. 2 id.
85. 2 id.
86. While equal in power, these two forms of legislative veto were not equal
in fad. A place on the Council of Revision would have given federal judges an
opportunity to veto statutes before they were enacted. Judicial review, if exercised
at all, would be exercised only after enactment. A place on the Council would have
therefore conferred a "first in time* advantage in comparison to judicial review.
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James Madison thought that Martin's discomfort with the
blending of judicial and executive power failed to take into
account the need for each department to mount "effectual barriers"? to maintain their original separation. George Mason of
Virginia then argued, contrary to Luther Martin, that giving
judges a place on the Council of Revision would lead to better
legislatiod8 Without that place on the Council, judges could
affect legislation in only a few instances. "They could declare
an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come
plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free co~rse."'~
Almost a month later the concept of judicial review arose
again during debates on the Council of Revision. On August
15th, John Francis Mercer, a newly-arrivedg0 delegate from
Maryland, "disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as
expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare
a law void."g1 Instead he thought that laws ought to be careJohn Dickinfully drafted "and then to be unc~ntroulable."~~
son of Delaware agreed-to a point. "He thought no such power
[as judicial review] ought to exist.'*3 Unlike Mr. Mercer, however, Dickinson could suggest no alternative to judicial review:4 implying that he found Mercer's alternative of unreviewable laws unsatisfactory.
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania immediately replied
that "[hle could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of
the Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation of
the Constitution was law."95 The first half of Morris's
statement is somewhat unclear, though he probably meant that
judges wield executive power.96The second half is fairly plain,
87. 2 RECORDS,
supra note 15,. at 77.
88. 2 id. at 78.
89. 2 id.
90. 2 KZ. at 176. Mercer first attended the Convention proceedings on August
6th. 2 id.
91. 2 id. at 298.
92. 2 id.
93. 2 id. at 299.
94. 2 id.
95. 2 id.
96. While this is a fair interpretation of Morris's statement, a well-known
contemporaneous writer disputed the notion that judicial power is a subset of executive power. JAMESWIISON,Of Government, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE
OF JAMESWILSON284,
JAMESWILSON,L.L.D. (1804, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS
296 @obert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
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however. Morris thought it objectionable to force judges to
validate unconstitutional laws. By this he may have meant that
judicial review was essential, even if federal judges were permitted to sit on the Coun~il.~'
The delegates' positions can be characterized in terms of
the following categories. Gerry, King, and Martin thought that
the grant of judicial power to the federal judiciary brought with
it the power of judicial review. They thought that including
judges on the Council of Revision was unnecessary or dangerous, the danger being a perceived violation of the principle of
the separation of powers.ss Wilson and Mason thought that judicial review did not go far enough, because it would not prevent Congress from passing unwise laws. They preferred judges
to exercise judicial review and a legislative veto on the Council
of Revision.
The other positions are unique to individuals. Morris
thought judicial review essential, even if judges sat on the
Council. His acceptance of judicial review puts him in agreement with most other delegates who spoke about judicial review, but his opinion about the Council of Revision is ambiguous. The records contain insufficient information to fairly conclude whether Morris favored or opposed judicial membership
on the Council. But on the issue of judicial review, six delegates were agreed: the grant of judicial authority entailed the
power of judicial review. Of the delegates whose statements I
have discussed, only Dickinson and Mercer expressed any
doubt about the desirability of letting judges exercise judicial
review. At the same time, however, Dickinson admitted the
absence of satisfactory alternatives to the exercise of judicial
review. Of all the delegates, only Mercer completely opposed
the concept of judicial review.
An interesting question remains, however. Why did Madison and Wilson repeatedly propose the Council of Revision i n
the face of persistent opposition? Madison may have wanted to,
include judges on the Council of Revision to avoid having to
directly raise the issue of judicial review. In a letter to James
Monroe, Madison wrote, "Such a Controul, restricted to Constitutional points, besides giving greater stability & system to the
rules of expounding the Instrument, would have precluded the
97. I owe this interpretive point to Professor David A. Thomas, whose course
on Anglo-American History provided the occasion to write this Comment.
supra note 15, at 75-77.
98. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS,
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question of a Judiciary annulment of Legislative Acts."gg One
can only guess why Madison thought it desirable t o "preclude"
the issue of judicial review. Perhaps he thought judicial review
desirable notwithstanding its potential di~isiveness.'~

C. Judicial Review in Other Contexts
On July 17th, two months into the Convention proceedings,
the delegates considered whether to give the national legislature the power t o directly veto state laws.lO' Roger Sherman
of Massachusetts thought the proposal unnecessary because
"the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law
contravening the Authority of the Union, and which the legislature would wish t o be negatived."lo2By this Sherman apparently meant that the state courts would exercise judicial review
and strike down unconstitutional state laws. Gouverneur Morris was also opposed to the congressional veto. "A law that
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary
departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a
Nationl. law."lo3 Here Morris laid out two alternatives that
he found preferable to a congressional veto on state laws: the
exercise of judicial review by federal courts and the exercise of
national legislative power by Congress.

99. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (December 27, 1817), in 3
supra note 15, at 424.
RECORDS,
100. I raise the possibility that Madison may have thought judicial review
potentially divisive based on the work of Forrest McDonald. He wrote of political
theory in the 1780s, "the notion that the judges should be so independent as to
have power to overrule juries or to pass upon the constitutionality of laws enacted
supra
by legislative bodies was alien to American theory and practice." MCDONALD,
note 65, at 85. However, judicial review turned out to be less controversial than
Madison thought: it was repeatedly mentioned during Convention debates without
attracting more than a single instance of outright opposition. See supra text accompanying note 91. In fact, Gordon Wood has chronicled how questioning the idea
of legislative supremacy led Americans of the 1780s toward the concept of judicial
review. See GORDON
S. WOOD,THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC17761787, at 455-63 (1969). More recently, Professor Wood has suggested that the idea
of an independent judiciary was alien in the 1780s because its development was
"[tlhe most dramatic institutional transformation in the early Republic." GORDONS.
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
323 (1992).
WOOD,THE &WZCALISM
101. 2 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 27. The entire text of the proposal reads,
"'To negative all laws passed by the several States <contravening in the opinion of
the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of ye Union.'>" 2 id. (footnote omitted).
102. 2 id.
103. 2 d.at 28.
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The topic of judicial review also arose during debates on
In its resoluthe proper mode of ratifying the Constit~tion.'~~
tion authorizing the Convention, Congress had specified that
any amendments t o the Articles of Confederation would be approved by the states.'05 But on July 23rd, the delegates took
up the question anyway, considering whether state legislatures
or specially-chosen ratifying conventions ought to have authority to ratify the Constituti~n.'~~
James Madison said that the
choice embraced a fundamental political difference between
kinds of political systems. "He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one
founded on the people, t o be the true difference between a
league or treaty, and a Constit~tion."'~'
Madison perceived two advantages in terms of "political
operation"'" that recommended the choice of ratifying conventions over state legislatures. First, if considered a treaty,
the union of American states would be subject t o international
law, which provides that a violation of any article of the treaty
by any party frees all other parties from their obligations under
the treaty.'Og This would perennially expose the union t o dissolution. However, if considered a constitution, the union's laws
would not be open to that interpretation, and the union would
be less vulnerable. Second, if considered a treaty the Constitution would not force judges t o invalidate laws that ran against
it.''' On the contrary, "A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the
Judges as null & void.""'
Madison's argument is especially interesting and significant in terms of locating the historical antecedents of Marbury v. Madison. Not only did Madison unambiguously state
the doctrine of judicial review, but he did so as a strong reason
in favor of conferring the ratifgring authority on special conventions rather than on state legislatures. At a deeper level,
this argument means that Madison favored placing sovereignty
squarely with "the people" rather than with the states. His

See 2 id. at 88-93.
Supra text accompanying note 53.
See 2 RECORDS,supra note 15, at 88.
2 id. at 93.

2
2
2
2

id.
id.
id.
id.
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tacit assumption seems t o have been that whoever holds the
authority t o ratify a constitution holds constitutive power itself,
because ratification is simply the means of exercising that
power. Few arguments could more persuasively give judicial
review a critical place in the constitutional universe than the
argument that judicial review is a necessary corollary of a
constitution founded on popular sovereignty. Madison implicitly
makes that argument here.
One month later, on August 22nd, the delegates considered
whether t o include in the Constitution express prohibitions
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.112Hugh Williamson, a delegate from North Carolina, explained that the
North Carolina Constitution included a prohibition on ex post
facto laws and that, "tho it has been violated, it has done good
there & may do good here, because the Judges can take hold of
it."'13 This reference to judicial review is veiled, but Williamson probably meant that including a constitutional prohibition
on ex post facto laws would give judges authority to strike
down such laws through the practice of judicial review.
Five days later the idea of judicial review again arose, this
time in the course of a debate over the proper scope of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.'" The subject of debate was article XI, section 3 of "the Report of the Committee of detail,""5 the direct antecedent of the first paragraph of the
current version of Article 111, section 2.'16 The original language had read,
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of
Officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more
States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction)
between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens
thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects."'

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

2 id. at 375-76.
2 id. at 376.
2 id. at 430-32.
2 id. at 177, 186-87, 430.
See U.S.CONST.art. 111; 2 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 186-87, 575-76.
2 RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 186.
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James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved t o amend the
last clause of this passage t o read, "to controversies [to which
shall be a party], between two or more States."'18
the U-SThe Convention accepted this amendment without objection.'19
Doctor William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut next proposed t o amend the first clause to read, "The Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court shall extend t o all cases arising under [this
Constitution and the] laws passed by the legislature of the
United
But, Madison objected to Johnson's proposal. He thought it probably extended the Court's jurisdiction too
far by potentially allowing the Court to hear cases not "of a
Judiciary Nature,"12' or what we today would call nonjusticiable issues. Moreover, he argued, "The right of expounding
the Constitution in cases not of this Cjudicial] nature ought not
to be given to that Department."lz2By this argument Madison lodged two independent objections to Johnson's proposed amendment. First, he understood the proposal to allow the Supreme Court to hear nonjusticiable issues; he thought that such
issues ought not come within the Court's jurisdiction. Second,
he seems t o have understood that the Court would have "the
right of expounding the Con~titution"'~in every case over
which it had jurisdiction, thus accepting judicial review only
over justiciable cases. Put simply, Madison thought that Johnson's proposed amendment extended the Court's jurisdiction too
far in general and the reach of judicial review too far in particular. Despite Madison's misgivings, the Convention adopted
Johnson's amendment, "it being generally supposed that the
jurisdiction given was constructively limited t o cases of a Judiciary nature."124
Thus many delegates made statements of varying clarity
and length about judicial review and the role they thought it
would play in the new constitutional order. Taken together
these statements suggest that judicial review was widely con-

118. See 2 id. at 186-87, 430 (emphasis added to highlight the proposed
amendment).
119. 2 id. at 430.
120. See 2 id. at 186, 430 (emphasis added to highlight the proposed amendment).
121. 2 id. at 430.
122. 2 id.
123. 2 id.
124. 2 id.
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sidered a necessary consequence of the grant of federal judicial
authority. Only two delegates, Mercer and Dickinson, made
statements unfavorable t o judicial review. From this evidence
one should be persuaded that judicial review was neither
strange nor tremendously controversial-despite Madison's
fears.lZ5Several delegates referred to judicial review, sometimes at length and sometimes in passing, without raising
more than a breath of opposition. What is more, those who
made such references came from New England (Massachusetts), the Middle Atlantic state of Pennsylvania, and the South
(Virginia), thus excluding sectional biases as a motivation. And
the group of delegates who spoke favorably of judicial review
included both Federalists and Antifederalists.lZ6 As other
commentators have observed, "[tlhe early Americans who were
opposed to the power of judicial review were not among the national leaders, and were too few in number t o constitute a maj~ r i t ~ . " ~ ~ '
Judicial review appears to have been uncontroversially
accepted by nearly all the members of the Constitutional Convention. Why, then, did they not explicitly vest federal courts
with the power of judicial review?12$ One reply is that the

125. See supra text accompanying note 99.
126. Forrest McDonald characterized the Convention delegates who spoke about
supra note
judicial review as having "widely divergent political views." MCDONALD,
65, at 254.
127. P. Allan Dionisopoulos & Paul Peterson, Rediscovering the American Origins of Judicial Review, 18 J. MARSHALL.
L. REV. 49, 56 (1984).
128. Had they wished to design an express bar against unconstitutional laws,
the Convention delegates could have looked for precedent and guidance to an interesting episode in English history. While imprisoned at the Tower of London, John
Lilburne and his Leveller colleagues, political radicals during the mid-seventeenthcentury struggles over English sovereignty, wrote An Agreement of the Free People
of England. This summary of their constitutional principles anticipated several
LILBURNE
rights later included in the American Bill of Rights. Compare, e.g., JOHN
ET AL., AN AGREEMENT
OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND
(1649), reprinted in THE
LEVELLERSIN THE ENGLISHREVOLUTION
165 (G.E. Aylmer ed., 1975) (forbidding
oficials to punish persons "for refusing to answer to questions against themselves
in Criminal1 causes") with US. CONST.amend. V (proclaiming that "[nlo person
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"). Toward the end of the same pamphlet the Levellers declared, "And all Laws made,
or that shall be made contrary to any part of this Agreement, are hereby made
ET AL., supra, at 168. This phraseology tantalizingly renull and void." LILBURNE
calls the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. See U.S. CONST.art. VI. Much ink and
energy might have been saved if the delegates had included in Article VI a clause
clearly pronouncing unconstitutional laws "null and voidn and specifying which
branch of government would determine the constitutionality of laws under which
conditions. For reasons that remain unknown, they did not.
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Framers considered the authority to disregard unconstitutional
legislation "a natural part of the total judicial power."129
Given the historical evidence, this conclusion is more persuasive than the contrary opinion that the Convention did not
explicitly grant the power of judicial review because it had
barely considered the concept.lsO
With these statements by the Constitutional Convention in
view, the next section will compare Federalist arguments made
by Publius in The Federalist Papers with Antifederalist arguments made by Brutus.

IV. COMPARING
BRUTUS
AND PLTI~LIUS
On the topic of judicial review, the most significant newspaper exchange to occur between the end of the Constitutional
Convention and the ratification of the Constitution occurred
between Brutus and Publius. Brutus was the pseudonym of
Robert Yates of New York, an Antifederalist; Publius was the
pseudonym of the authors of the Federalist Papers: Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.13' The ensuing debate, waged in the New York press, aimed to decide whether
New York would join the Union.ls2
Bmtus argued that federal courts would have the power of
judicial review.
[Ilf the legislature [Congress] pass laws, which, in the judgment of the [Supreme] court, they are not authorised to do by

129. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at 62.
Discussion of judicial review at the Constitutional Convention was
slight. Some commentators have emphasized that both the relative silence
of the members of the Convention on the subject of judicial review, and
the silence of the Constitution, is evidence that we cannot know what the
framers intended with regard to this power. It is altogether reasonable to
reach another conclusion: to the extent that judicial review was discussed,
the power was assumed and referred to with approval. At least some
members of the Convention regarded judicial review as a natural part of
the judicial power within the constitutional system.
Id. at 57-58 (footnotes omitted).
130. "A second fundamental principle on which the delegates were in general
agreement was that, despite the shakiness of the precedents for the doctrine, the
courts would by the very nature of their function have the power to strike down
legislative acts if they were in violation of the Constitution." MCDONALD,
supra
note 65, at 254.
OF POLITICAL
PHILQSOPHY
131. Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HIS~ORY
659, 659-60 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
132. Id. at 659.
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the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it
will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or
supreme law. And the courts are vested with the supreme and
uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, which, in their judgment, opposes the
constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior
law give way to an inferior. The legislature, therefore, will not
go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they are
confined.133

This explanation of judicial review bears a striking resemblance to the explanation provided by Publiusl" in Federalist
78, as will be evident shortly. If nothing else, this statement
alone shows that the pre-Marbury concept of judicial review
was not the exclusive property of Alexander Hamilton, the author of Federalist 78.
Brutus also argued that the Supreme Court was dangerous
because its opinion was final and its members independent.
"No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power
above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications."'" At a superficial level, Brutus's first objection is easy
to dismiss. If a legal system is to have any finality, there must
be a court from whose decision there is no appeal. It is difficult
to imagine what legal system Brutus would have advocated in
its place. Any constitutional "errors" committed by the Supreme
Court are technically correctable through amendment.lsp
However, as Brutus may have foreseen, constitutional amendment is a remedy that corrects erroneous constitutional interpretations by the Supreme Court only a t great cost. Other
branches of government, Congress and the President, are not
equipped to correct the Supreme Court's errors of constitutional
interpretation. Such errors are most easily corrected by later
Court cases-meaning that they are not easily corrected a t all.

133. "Brutus" XU,N.Y.J., Feb. 7 & 14, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATEON
THE CONSTITUTION
171, 172 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE].
134. In referring to the author of the Federalist as "Publius" I follow the late
Professor Diamond who argued that the pseudonym should be taken seriously,
especially as regarding the contributions of Alexander Hamilton. Diamond, supra
note 131, at 660.
135. "Brutus" Xl,N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE,
supra note 133,
at 129, 129.
136. See U.S.CONST.art. V.
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As for Brutus's objection to the independence of federal judges,
Publius made an extended response, which will be discussed
shortly.
Brutus reasoned that judicial review would give the Supreme Court power to expand federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states. He argued that the grant of judicial power
"in Law and Equity"'" meant that the Supreme Court would
have the power to decide cases "according t o what appears to
From the
them, the reason and spirit of the constit~tion."'~~
power of judicial review and the power of construing the Constitution in equitable terms,lsg Brutus concluded that "[tlhe
judicial power will operate to effect . . . an entire subversion of
the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual
states."140
Those who favored ratification found their lasting voice in
The Federalist. Partly because it is so familiar as a text, a word
of introduction describing its historical context may be helpful.
The Federalist was written t o persuade the citizens of New
York, especially those citizens likely t o influence the outcome of
the state ratifying convention, to vote for the Con~titution.'~~
However, it was something more, even t o the authors themselves.
It seems clear that its authors also looked beyond the immediate struggle' and wrote with a view to influencing later
generations by making their work the authoritative commentary on the meaning of the Constitution. While The Federalist
was the most immediate kind of political work, a piece of
campaign propaganda, it spoke also to thoughtful men then
and now, with a view to the permanence of its argument.'42

Publius's explanation of judicial review in Federalist 78
may be so well known asto be thought trite. However, it represents the most significant pre-Marbury explanation of judicial
review.'" It tells much about how judicial review was regarded by the Founders. In rehearsing Publius's argument it is appropriate to pay special attention t o premises and logical con-

U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2 .
"Brutus"XI, supra note 133, at 132.
Id. at 132-35.
Id. at 133.
Diamond, supra note 131, at 659.
Id.
See GUNTHER,
supm note 8, at 13.
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nections that, because of the familiarity of Publius's overall
argument, may otherwise go unnoticed.
Publius began his explanation for judicial review with two
important claims. First, a limited constitution1" requires an
independent judiciary.145 Constitutional limitations (in this
instance, limitations chiefly on legislative power) can be maintained in practice only through judicial enforcement, since it is
the duty of courts "to declare all acts contrary t o the manifest
tenor of the constitution void."'46 Second, reserving rights
under a constitution without judicial review would be pointless.14' What do these claims mean, and what questions do
they raise?
By making a limited constitution dependent on the existence of an independent judiciary, Publius made what is
uncontroversial-a universal desire for a limited constitution--dependent on the existence of what is controver~ i a l ' ~ ~ -genuinely
a
independent judiciary. If sound, his claim
forces critics either t o abandon the pursuit of a limited constitution or to accept the necessity of a truly independent judiciary.
Publius connected judicial review with the need for an
independent judiciary when he claimed that judicial review ensures the limits originally imposed by the Constitution. Here it
is not merely the existence of an independent judiciary that
matters, but an independent judiciary with the duty and authority t o invalidate unconstitutional legislation. Constitutional
limits would fade away in practice, Publius suggested, without
the force of judicial review. In this way, Publius responded to
Brutus's argument that conferring independence on federal
judges is undesirable because it shields them from being removed for erroneous adjudication.'" His response implied
that the benefits of an independent judiciary outweigh the risks
(however real) of erroneous adjudication.
144. Hamilton defined a "limited constitution" as one that imposes limits on
the legislature's authority. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). At a minimum, this definition requires a constitution not to permit an omnicompetent legislature: government must be prohibited
from exercising legislative power in specified ways.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The idea of a judiciary independent of majoritarian processes was alien to
American experience before the 1780s. Supra note 100.
149. See "Brutus" XI, supra note 133, at 129.
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He also connected judicial review with the separation of
powers. Without judicial review, Publius wrote, it would be
pointless to reserve on paper what could not be preserved in
practice.
Will it be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power? This i s the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of
most of the American [state] Constitutions. But experience
assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
over-rated; and that some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more
powerful members of the government. The legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.150

From this it follows that both a limited constitution and the
separation of powers depend for their practical effectuation on
the existence of judicial review.
Publius then replied to the argument that judicial review
makes the judiciary superior to the legislature. This argument,
he perceived, depends on the proposition that "the authority

150. THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, supra note 144, at 332-33 (James Madison) (emphasis added). By his reference to unadorned declarations of the principle of separation of powers, Madison was probably thinking of declarations like those then
contained in the constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts.
The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the
other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of
them, at the same time; except that the Justices of the County Courts
shall be eligible to either House of Assembly.
VA. CONST.of 1776, reprinted in 10 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITEDSTATES
C O N ~ I O N52S (William F. Swindler ed., 1979). The Virginia Constitution of
1776 thus provided only a single exception to its declaration of the principle of
separation of powers: "Justices of the County Courts" could run for a seat in the
state legislature. Id. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed for no exceptions at all.
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them;
the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of
laws, and not of men.
MASS.CONST.of 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in 5 id. at 96.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be
superior to the one whose acts may be declared void."lsl
Publius's response t o this argument moved through several
stages. He began w-ith the principle that "every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under
which it is exercised, is void."ls2 In support of this principle,
Publius launched an argument ad absurdum. If this principle
were not true, he wrote, deputy would govern principal, servant
would rule master, popular representatives would be superior
t o the people whom they represent, and people acting by virtue
of delegated power "may do not only what their powers do not
authorise, but what they forbid."ls3 Since these propositions
are absurd, Publius implied, the principle of judicial review
must be true.
Next he addressed the argument that Congress is authorized to make its own interpretations of the constitutionality of
its acts. He challenged this argument on two grounds. First,
the argument cannot be presumed without explicit textual
support, which, Publius suggested, the Constitution does not
provide. Also, one cannot presume that the Constitution authorizes congressional representatives "to substitute their will to
that of their constituent^."'^^ This objection simply restates a
form of the principle he earlier defended: every legislative act
must conform itself t o the constituent acts of the people, or it is
void.
In place of these misunderstandings of judicial power,
Publius offered a particular understanding of the place and appropriate role of judicial power within the political system
created and anticipated by the new constitution. "It is far more
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, t o keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their a~thority."'~
Publius thus declared that the
federal judiciary was designed to check the tendency of legislatures to exceed their authority.15'

THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 144, at 524.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525.
See id. at 524-25.
Id. at 525.
See id.
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If this proposition is true, two inferences follow: legislative
power can pose a genuine threat to constitutional government,
and the federal judiciary has the constitutional authority t o
repel that threat. Publius's statement also means that the Constitution imposes certain limits on legislative authority. (He
made that clear by earlier defining the Constitution as a limited constitution and a limited constitution as one that imposes
limits on legislative authority.)'" The threat Publius perceived is the possibility of the legislature-in this instance Congress--exceeding its constitutional authority. By his claim that
the Constitution authorizes the federal judiciary t o enforce the
constitutional limits on congressional action, Publius articulated a significant constitutional role for federal judges. They
were to be not merely the arbiters of disputes between states or
individuals, but the means by which popularly elected legislators are prevented from stepping outside their constitutional
bounds. Publius conceived of judicial review as a significant
check on legislative power. Thus the idea of judicial review
acting as a check on legislative authority did not originate in
the fertile mind of Justice Marshall.
How did Publius justify authorizing judges t o invalidate
legislation duly passed by popular representatives? He did so
first by defining the Constitution as fundamental law.'"
Since legal interpretation properly belongs with the courts,160
and since constitutional interpretation is a subset of legal interpretation, courts have authority to interpret the Constitution
just as they have the authority t o interpret a piece of ordinary
legislation.16'
Although it might be possible to conceive of a constitution
that is not defined as fundamental law, two considerations
weigh against interpreting the American Constitution in that
manner. First, the Constitution itself states that it is "the supreme Law of the Land."'" While Article VI also categorizes
federal laws and treaties as supreme law, the Constitution
appears first in that list, a textual placement that has been
generally interpreted to indicate the superiority of the Constitution over the other two kinds of law.'" Second, not defining
158. Id. at 524.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 525.
Id.
See id.
U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U S . 1 (1957) (holding that the Constitution is
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the Constitution as fundamental law, which can be judicially
interpreted and applied, raises serious problems of enforcement. How should constitutional limits be enforced if not
through the courts? Should we trust Congress to enforce the
constitutional limits on its own authority? If one chooses not to
enforce a constitution at all, what means can prevent a legislature from usurping more power than the constitution authorizes? Without enforcing the limits on congressional power, could
we honestly call our Constitution limited in any meaningful
sense of the term?
Publius next considered judicial review itself: What should
a court do when faced with "an irreconcileable variance"164
between an ordinary statute and a constitutional provision?
"[Tlhat which has the superior obligation and validity ought of
course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought
to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people t o the
intention of their agents."'" This statement has been so often
repeated that it may be useful t o unpack its logic.
First, Publius began with the premise of "irreconcileable
v a r i a n ~ e " 'between
~
an ordinary act of Congress and a provision of the Constitution. What that means Publius did not
explain, but it seems fair t o say that the variance could not be
slight or superficial to qualify as "irreconcileable." At least it
means that Publius envisioned the exercise of judicial review
when a court could not consistently apply both a statute and a
constitutional provision to decide a case.
Second, Publius said that a subordinate law must yield t o
a superior one. That proposition states a truism, but it does not
necessarily follow, as Publius tried t o suggest, that the Constitution is superior to congressional statutes. One can conceive
of a reasonable political regime in which a constitution is defined as law, but law that may yield to a strong legislative
mandate, such as a three-fourths vote. Only when a constitution is defined as fundamental law, as law superior t o every
other category of law, does Publius's argument necessarily follow. For if the Constitution is fundamental law, Publius soundly argued that every law that is not fundamental must yield t o

superior to treaties); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187, 177-78 (1803)
(holding that the Constitution is superior to ordinary statutes).
164. THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 144, at 525.

165. Id.
166. Id.
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constitutional law. This step in Publius's argument therefore
depends on the premise that the Constitution is fundamental
law. Publius concluded that "the power of the pe~ple"'~'is
superior t o both legislatures and courts; neither body is superior to the other?
Comparison with Brutus's argument at this stage is enlightening. Brutus and Publius agreed on their description of
judicial review in nearly every detail: the grant of judicial authority entailed the power of judicial review, which would operate on state and federal courts alike. However, they disagreed
about what judicial review meant for the states and the relative power of courts and legislatures. Brutus thought judicial
review meant the "subver~ion"'~~
of the states, while Publius
thought it meant the protection of the people from legislative
encroachments. Their point of disagreement therefore did not
turn on the existence or nonexistence of judicial review. It did
not even turn on the scope of judicial review. It turned solely
on the question whether judicial review would yield desirable
consequences for the American people, and the answer to that
question depended on whether one viewed the states as protective or oppressive of individual rights. Judicial review was acknowledged by Federalist and Antifederalist alike to be a fact
of the new constitutional regime.
Both Constitutional Convention records and succeeding
debates in the press demonstrate that the concept of judicial
review was widely discussed long before Justice Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison. But was the concept raised in the
state ratifying conventions?

Several delegates t o the state ratifying conventions spoke
about judicial review. What follows will be only a sample of
such remarks, but it is an important sample. The records of the
ratifying conventions are often-I think unduly-ignored. We
have some evidence that Madison, the guiding force behind the
writing and adoption of the Constitution, thought them the
most important historical evidence of constitutional meaning.
In a letter t o Major Henry Lee, Madison wrote,

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. "Brutus" XI, supra note 133, at 133.
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I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution. And
if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no
security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithfbl,
exercise of its power^."^

Leaving aside the question of ranking the historical records in
order of relative importance, I will now present some illustrative remarks about judicial review made by delegates to the
state ratifying conventions. These remarks will receive only a
brief introduction, because they largely reiterate a theory of
judicial review already discussed at length.
In the Connecticut Convention, Oliver Ellsworth made the
same co~ectionsbetween judicial independence, popular sovereignty, and judicial review for which Publius argued at
length.
This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the
general government. If the general legislature should a t any
time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if
they make a law which the constitution does not authorise, i t
is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who to
secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will
declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is an usurpation
upon the general government, the law is void, and upright
independent judges will declare it to be so.17'

James Wilson made a similar statement, with even more
clarity, in the Philadelphia Convention. His statement is particularly significant because of his status as "second only t o Madison in terms of his influence on the drafting of the Constituti~n."l'~
I had occasion, on a former day, to state that the power of the
constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature,
acting under that constitution. For i t is possible that the

170. Letter from James Madison to H. Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LE'~TERsAND

OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISONFOURTH
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNRED STATES
442 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
171. Oliver Ellsworth, Speech to the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7,
1788), reprinted in 1 DEBATE,
supra note 133, at 877, 883.
172. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at 59.
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legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress the
bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual
mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes
to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its
principles, and find i t to be incompatible with the superior
power of the constitution, it is their duty to pronounce i t void;
and judges independent, and not obliged to look to every session, for a continuance of their salaries, will behave with
intrepidity, and refuse to act the sanction of judicial
authority.'"

Other statements came from two surprising quarters in the
Virginia Convention. First, Patrick Henry, who led the Virginia
anti federalist^,'^^ objected to the Constitution because he
was unsure whether federal judges would rule invalid congressional acts that exceeded constitutional bounds.
The Honorable Gentleman did our Judiciary honour in
saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature
in some cases. Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the
Legislature. We have this land mark to guide us.-They had
fortitude to declare that they were the Judiciary and would
oppose unconstitutional acts. Are you sure that your Federal
Judiciary will act thus? Is that Judiciary so well constructed
and so independent of the other branches, as our State Judiciary? Where are your land-marks in this Government? I will
be bold to say you cannot find any in it. I take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the Legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the Judiciary.'"

Second, in what may be the most surprising remark of all,
John Marshall himself spoke of judicial review as a protection-maybe the only effective protection-against unconstitutional acts by government. "To what quarter will you look for
protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will
not give the power to the Judiciary? There is no other body
that can afford such a pr~tection."'~~

173. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1,
1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE,supra note 133, at 820, 823.
174. See CLWTON,supra note 13, at 68.
175. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12,
supra note 133, at 673, 684-85.
1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE,
176. John Marshall, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20,
supra note 133, at 730, 732-33.
1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE,
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In short, delegates from every region and from both
Antifederalist and Federalist camps delivered clear remarks
about the existence and importance of judicial review for the
new constitutional regime. Once again, Justice Marshall's supposed innovation in Marbury appears less than innovative.
Remarks by delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Wilson's statement to the Pennsylvania Convention, and arguments by Publius and Brutus together form a coherent theory
of judicial review,'?' which was available to Justice Marshall
when he wrote the Court's opinion in Marbury.
VI.

SHAPING THE DISCUSSION
OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW

This Comment began by asking what the Founders said
about judicial review. The historical evidence presented here
demonstrates that they said more about it than is commonly
supposed. Many of the most influential Founders spoke of judicial review as if it were a part of the authority granted to
courts by the Constitution. And they mainly agreed that the
principal benefit of judicial review is that it would keep legislatures, both federal and state, from straying outside the boundaries marked by the Constitution.
In Federalist 51, Publius made a well-known statement
about the design and purpose behind the Constitution, as exemplified by its application of the separation of powers. It will
shed some light on the Founders' theory of judicial review.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department, consists in giving
to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to
controul the abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the
government to controul the governed; and in the next place,
177. See Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, a t 63.
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oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

Here Publius explains that the basic political principle, the
separation of powers, would languish in practice if not for the
"auxiliary precautions" commonly known as checks and balances. Supposed violations of the separation of powers, such as the
participation of the President in legislation through the exercise of veto power,17g are paradoxically devices to keep the
separation of powers from becoming only a paper declaration.
By articulating statements made by the Founders about
judicial review as a coherent theory, and by applying the same
kind of reasoning to judicial review that Publius applied to the
separation of powers and checks and balances, it is possible to
see how the Founders could have defended their theory of judicial review as coherent and cogent. Popular sovereignty is a
fundamental political principle in our society. But a constitutional declaration that the people are sovereign would not be
enough, in practice, to maintain the integrity of the principle.l8' Without some means of ensuring fidelity to the largest
exertions of popular sovereignty-the political commitments
recorded in constitutional text-popular
sovereignty would
exist in name only. The "auxiliary precaution" designed to
maintain that fidelity is judicial review.
Judicial review stands in a paradoxical relationship to
popular sovereignty. Just as checks and balances appear to
violate the principle of the separation of powers by involving
each branch in the business of the others, judicial review appears to violate the principle of popular sovereignty by allowing
unelected judges to invalidate the acts of popularly elected
representatives. However, if we accept Publius's reasoning, it is
necessary to allow some violations of the principle in theory to
preserve the principle in practice. Given the connection many
178. THEFEDERALIST
No. 51, supra note 144, at 349 (James Madison).
179. See US. CONST.
art. I, 8 7.
180. During the Constitutional Convention, Madison acknowledged the necessity
of checking legislative power. "Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real
source of danger to the American Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving
every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with repubsupra note 15, at 74; see also supra note 150 and
lican principles." 2 RECORDS,
accompanying text (discussing a similar statement by Madison in The Federalist).

1511

JUDICIAL REVIEW

185

Framers drew between judicial review and popular sovereignty,
it is fair t o say that judicial review was designed t o preserve
popular sovereignty, not destroy it. Judicial review was designed t o hold governmeni faithful to the constitutional commitments of the people.
This early theory of judicial review ought t o be treated as
the appropriate reference point when discussing the proper
scope of the exercise of judicial review. Without such an historical reference point, constitutional theory can slip its moorings
and drift rudderless on a sea of so-called pure theory.''' A
theory designed without regard for history obscures more than
of the
it clarifies in a field as deeply influenced by the
past as constitutional law. The early theory of judicial review
provides a means of getting one's bearings and maintaining
close ties with the changing realities of our national life. However, it should not be taken for more than that-especially not
as a fmal resting place. Serious, robust discussion about the
proper scope of the Court's exercise of judicial review ought t o
continue because it has intrinsic value. But it remains valuable
only so far as it is tempered by an acute awareness of history.
Returning to the question of historical legitimacy, the
weight of evidence falls against the opinion of Crosskey, Hand,
and others. Marshall did not need to invent the concept of judicial review; it had been already conceived and discussed by delegates to the Constitutional Convention, by Brutus and Publius, and by members of the state ratifying conventions. "The
Marshall Court did not create judicial review. Rather, it presented a classical statement on behalf of judicial review."'82
Therefore, to the degree that scholars conceive of judicial
review as resting on an historical basis of questionable legitimacy,la both the policymaking conception of judicial review
held by the Cooper Court and the legislative deference expressed by the Williamson Court ought t o be rejected. The Supreme Court has no historical support to occupy either the
zenith of the American constitutional order or its nadir. If
these conceptual extremes were rejected, there would remain a
wide range of alternative ways of discussing judicial review
whose soundness scholars and practitioners would continue to
fruitfully debate. But the extremes represented by Cooper and
181. See CLINTON,
supra note 13, at 10.
182. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at 75.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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Williamon should be no longer treated as serious theoretical
positions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial review was not the invention of Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court in Marbury u. Madison. The historical evidence presented in this Comment demonstrates instead that a coherent theory of judicial review already existed,
which enabled Marshall t o decide Marbury without resorting to
a judicial version of Original Sin.lS4Contrary t o Judge Hand
and Professor Crosskey, the history of constitutional drafting
and ratification shows that the historical roots of judicial review run deep into constitutional soil. This historical conclusion
undermines the Court's conception of its power in Cooper u.
Aaron and Williamson u. Lee Optical Co.;judicial review confers on the Court neither the power to range across the constitutional landscape looking for violations to correctla5 nor the
power t o cloister itself from cases that present a conflict between a statute and the Constitution.lspThese extreme positions in the discussion of judicial review should be abandoned
as historically baseless. We should resolve to abandon them
and t o use the early theory of judicial review as a point of reference. By doing so, we would reshape the discussion of judicial
review. Could such reshaping free us to discuss in more fruitful
and, perhaps, less polarizing ways the constitutional power of
judges to address our nation's most vexing political disputes?

Shawn Gunnarson

184. Cf. CLINTON,
supra note 13, at 6 (contending that the orthodox reading of
Marbury leads to the opinion that "judicial review is thereby tainted with something like original sin").
185. See id. at 29.
186. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtuesn--A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964).

